The Current War
I guess I'll follow up my piece from Friday,
Our good friend Vladimir Putin (can we agree that president Medvedev is a cipher?) has invaded north Georgia. His provocation was Georgia's assertion of authority over its own territory. He had set this up, long before the actual provocation by issuing Russian passports to ethnic Russians in Ossetia. So, once Georgia tried to crack down on the separatists, he could sweep in to protect Russian citizens. This is a time-honored tactic used by the Nazis in the Seudeten Land as well as all through the 19th Century as Germany and France fought over Alsace.
Our American position on this--in so far as we have one--is not very coherent. We would like Putin to stop and to play nice. This desire, were it to be fulfilled, would be without precedent both for Russia and Putin. Secretary Rice, an expert on Soviet/American relations, apparently is not so current on Russian/American relations and has done nothing of merit or use in checking Russia's hegemonic ambition and desire to re-integrate its former republics back under Russian control. That Russia's ambition also includes its former client states--Poland, Latvia and Lithuania is also obvious. That our efforts to check their ambitions have been futile is also clear.
Our incoherence and ineptitude may have actually been a part of the problem. We not only did nothing to stay Russian ambition, we may have actively, if unintentionally, fed it. As we expanded NATO (an idea and institution whose day has past), we have been deaf to Russian concerns about our expansion of power and influence to their very borders. Our friendship with Georgia did Georgia no favor. Our desire to install missiles in Poland and other former Soviet satellite states increases Russia's sense of persecution and vulnerability. We are pushing our sphere of influence towards their borders as their economic power has grown, largely through oil, and they feel a complicated and conflicted set of emotions.
They feel the power of their economy. They feel threatened by the further splintering of their former republics and movements for independence from various non-Russian ethnic minorities. They feel shame for their defeat in Afghanistan and frustration over their inability, despite disproportionate violence, to calm and control Chechnya. They feel powerful in their influence in the Middle East and unhappy with American policies in, what they consider to be, their own backyard. This is why they are making more and more noises about increasing aid and trade with Cuba, Venezuela and other parts of our backyard. They are committed to being as in our face as they see us in theirs.
It is important to understand Russian interests and drives. This is not to defend their brutality but to realistically be able to understand their drives, ambitions and policy choices. So far, we have not demonstrated a nuanced understanding of who they are, and therefore we keep getting surprised when they act as they have always acted. They also react to our policies in ways that are completely predictable.
We should also note that along with their nostalgia for a greater Russia and discomfort with independent and western-leaning regimes on their borders, there are also major oil pipelines running through Georgia. They understand, as we should, that we are involved in a struggle for influence and control of those pipelines. These are all powerful reasons for them to ignore us and to be as unhelpful as possible with Iran, the Middle East or any other place where our interests do not converge.
So that's it. Don't you also think it is interesting that this was happening while our president sat in the Olympic bleachers looking at his watch? I wondered why he would come all the way back to the White House Rose Garden to speak to reporters when he was already overseas and could have taken a detour to Russia and Georgia.