Understanding Iran

Okay, the title is a lie. There is no understanding Iran. There are facts, there is a search for patterns and there is a lot of history. Still, understanding will continue to elude us.

The common wisdom is, as the word "common" implies, probably wrong. Sure Ahmadinejad may have stolen the election. But that is far from certain. That it was rigged is likely, but the stolen question misses an important point. Rather like the police framing OJ, they may have cheated but they framed a guilty man. Ahmadinejad might have won fair and square, but the mullahs calculated that a big point spread would cause fewer problems than Florida-like finish with both sides claiming victory and refusing to recognize the elected government as legitimate. The mullahs may have miscalculated.

Most of us in the west just assumed that the liberal reformer, Moussavi, would win in a fair election. He is who we would vote for, and he was the candidate of most of the Iranians we saw interviewed on TV. We figured, mostly correctly, that educated people living in the cities would be more likely to vote for him than for Ahmadinejad.

We forgot, however, to calculate our observational bias. We interviewed city people. We telephone polled people who, well, had telephones. Our media preferred talking to people who spoke English. Hmmmm. How could we go wrong considering that this demographic is a minority in a country of rural poor, seriously religious, non-English speaking and telephonically deprived.

Nor is the common wisdom necessarily correct in so far as the mullahs are concerned. They are not monolithic supporters of Ahmadinejad. He is not only an embarrassment in his crude populism, but he also has forged an alliance with the military. His support of bellicose rhetoric, arms programs and nuclear ambition puts him and the military establishment in conflict with many of the mullahs. In Iran, as in Pakistan, the military is not simply the army. It is also militias, political groups and a force in industry.
We understood correctly that true democracy was unlikely even with a more or less liberal president because the Mullahs could veto any policy. We did not understand that the military can do to the Mullahs what they do to elected officials. They are a major political and economic force--not a narrow special interest. A close winning alliance of the military and Ahmadinejad would be a disaster, making us long for the good old day of the once-mighty mullahs.

We in the west just assumed that Moussavi was a good guy and his election would change everything. This was based only on a hope and the calculation that anyone would be better than Ahmadinejad. We should have known that he was associated with the original revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini. He has a reputation for guile and corruption, and did not get where is by being soft on Israel or an America-phile. He might well have been better but he was not the coming of the messiah.

Finally, as we look at the protests in the streets of Tehran, some are saying this is good for America and that it might be the start of another revolution. These are possibilities, but neither singularly nor linked are they self-evidently good. The young, educated and urban could be crushed, and a civil war could push the military into distracting adventures. Another unstable regime in the region is not to be wished for.

This is a good time, as they say about some cancers, for "watchful waiting" and not for an heroic intervention into their mess. If our recent history in the Muslim world should teach us anything it is this: We do not understand as much as we think, as much as we can nor as much as we should.
©2009 Jonathan Dobrer
www.Dobrer.com