Robert C.J. Parry: April 2008 Archives

Yesterday, the DN linked to an NPR story that was billed as a profile of Officer Jennifer Grasso, the first woman to enter the LAPD's SWAT school. Interestingly, the only thing it said about Grasso was that she refused to be interviewed. Some profile.

That may be the only thing the report got right. Top to bottom, the story is riddled with factual errors, blatantly stereo-typed prejudice and gross omissions (for instance, trumpeting an officers $2 million jury verdict, while failing to mention said verdict was overturned on appeal).

Here, then, is the commentary in response that I have prepared for NPR. They've not seen fit to get back to me. I'm shocked.

The Politically Incorrect Truth About LAPD's First Female SWAT Officer:

NPR's recent profile of Los Angeles Police Officer Jennifre Grasso, the first female selectee for the renown LAPD SWAT team, left out numerous key facts and advanced patently false misperceptions and liberal stereo-types.

Let's stipulate now that Jennifer Grasso is an outstanding cop. Those who have worked with her say she's far better than most male officers. SWAT officers I know were disappointed when she failed their stringent 2006 selection.

This doesn't change a simple fact: If Grasso is passes SWAT school, it will only be because she's a woman, and Police Chief Bratton wants a woman on SWAT, capable or not.

NPR failed to mention that Grasso recently committed a violation of weapons' safety so egregious that most present SWAT officers would have been removed from the team for the same. She accidentally fired an MP-5 submachine gun, without even having the weapon in a firing position.

Before now, SWAT officers were expected to arrive with the finest weapons handling traits. Just as diamonds can be cut and polished only to standards their chemical traits permit, so too are weapons skills limited. By choosing only officers with the finest innate traits - those with skills that need to be honed, not learned - SWAT has amassed a remarkable record - killing less than 1% of the extremely dangerous suspects they confront and only one hostage ever - and arguably not even her.

In past years, dozens of male and female candidates have been disqualified for even placing a finger on the trigger at the wrong time. Every professional weapons handling standard starts with "never put a finger on the trigger unless you are ready to fire." Grasso went one better, spraying rounds into the dirt in front of her.

She literally could have killed someone, yet is still in school.

Does anyone really believe no SWAT standards have been lowered, as CPT Jeff Greer asserted?

This is no minor matter to current SWAT cops. Would you want to confront an armed suspect knowing the officer behind you had accidentally fired the same machine gun that is now inches from your back? If you're a hostage, is that officer your first choice of rescuer?

NPR also failed to tell you that the selection procedure that picked Grasso used only five of the 18 standards that were previously used to evaluate candidates. Among the eliminated tests, was a simulated hostage rescue that very closely mirrored the 2005 incident in which SWAT is believed to have accidentally killed a little girl - the Suzie Pena case which supposedly led to this change. It is that same test that former officer Nina Acosta barely passed in the early 1990s before suing the City for discrimination. Contrary NPR's report that she wasn't selected because of her gender, officers who testified in the trial say Acosta hesitated for three or four seconds inside that room while fumbling with her weapon. Most police gun battles are over in half that time.

That is why Acosta's $2 million verdict was thrown out by an appeals court, another fact NPR left out.

NPR also was quick to quote LAPD observer Joe Domanick, a journalist who's never carried a gun, much less served as an LAPD officer. According to him, blacks and Latinos were only admitted to SWAT following a consent decree, and the unit is still largely a bastion of whites.

In fact, this is false. Among the very first SWAT officers were several highly regarded officers of a variety of ethnicities. One black sergeant is regarded by old timers as a key to the team's early growth. A large number of the team was Hispanic. Today, African American officers make up a greater percentage of SWAT than the LAPD as a whole - something that was true before Randal Simmons was murdered in Winnetka earlier this year.

But, to Domanick and NPR (who apparrently didn't bother going to look at SWAT), this is a white male bastion.

The fact is, contrary to NPR's assertions, SWAT is a bastion of excellence of all colors, and diverse in its expertise. Its record proves it rarely uses force, and its ranks include some of the world's best-trained - and most successful - hostage negotiators.

How could NPR get so many facts wrong and omit so many important points? I'd venture to say NPR is far more prejudiced against folks in blue, than SWAT cops are anyone of any color. Or any gender.

The loser in all of this is Grasso. Frankly, lots of folks can make mistakes with a weapon. Officers who have done so in the past have retested the selection process and made the team, without doubts. Grasso will not be so fortunate. Regardless of the selection standards used, she will now always be known as the woman who had the standards changed for her, and who got away with something no man ever would.

Sometimes when you shatter a non-existent glass ceiling, you still get cut be falling shards.

And, remember, the standards have not been lowered.

The LAPD SWAT Board of Inquiry report that Police Chief William Bratton unveiled this morning is a remarkable insult to the people and police officers of Los Angeles. It recommends a litany of politically correct changes that have been used to eliminate 13 of the 18 standards SWAT has used for two decades in selecting its new officers. It even goes so far as to describe SWAT - not the criminals it captures - as “a threat to” Los Angeles as a whole.

In my research on this issue, I’ve interviewed officers whose experience totals more than 150 years on the department, a century in SWAT. Their comments on a draft copy of the un-released BOI report have been consolidated in a “Counter Analysis,” which will be released later today. It is a point-by-point review of both the BOI’s recommendations and their methodology for reaching them. In short, there was none.

These officers refuse to be identified because of an unprecedented campaign of intimidation LAPD management has pressed on SWAT. Bratton has gone so far as to remove officers from operations because of the comments of their wives and threatening to transfer out any officer who speaks his mind – publicly or privately.

These comments prove the BOI report is riddled with factual error; blatantly biased; ignorant of basic tactics; vaguely stated so as to be meaningless; and dramatically self-contradictory. Its recommendations are almost universally unsubstantiated. First hand evidence is almost non-existent.

And they make some compelling points. The BOI’s statement “we observed SWAT operations” is factually supported only by a single board member having observed only a single warrant service, officers say. Yet, Bratton wants to use that “examination” to trash procedures has saved countless lives.

Perhaps the two most bothersome aspects of the report are these: First, the BOI’s stated purpose – to investigate the death of a child – was a lie to the people of Los Angeles The BBOI was allegedly convened to review the July 10, 2005 killing of 19-month-old Suzie Pena during a SWAT standoff. Bratton’s statements and the LAPD press release were unambiguous. Yet, the BOI report clearly states that the BOI didn’t even attempt to examine the incident – and Bratton himself privately described the Pena case as a mere “catalyst” for a long-desired review, the report shows

Second, the 67-page report acknowledges then blatantly ignores SWAT’s remarkable record: In nearly 4000 call-outs (through 2005), the team lost only one hostage (Suzie Pena) and had killed only 31 suspects – less than 1% of the total they’ve confronted among the City’s worst offenders.

The analysis of these officers reveals that the BOI report is rife with factual errors. It repeatedly refers to SWAT having “Few African Americans.” In fact, there are more African Americans on SWAT than the LAPD as a whole (by percentage); something that would have been obvious if the board had simply shown up.

In reviewing a specific incident, the BOI (which had three lawyers but only one tactical expert) faulted SWAT for not using techniques “so that the less lethal weapon could be fired and its results evaluated before the (shot)gun was fired.” But, the BOI’s account clearly proves the officers did exactly that.

In reviewing a set of cases, the BOI said “In each of these instances, mental illness was not… taken into account in formulating an operational plan.” In fact, the LAPD Behavioral Science Services unit was on hand and making recommendations.

But, like any Politburo-style finding, the facts aren’t going to get in the way of these conclusions.

The BOI’s ignorance of tactical practices is shocking. In reviewing SWAT’s command and control methods, one member was quoted as saying “I like the sergeant being there. It establishes fire arms control.” However, most sergeants in SWAT have no SWAT experience where as many of SWAT’s Team Leaders have been on hundreds or thousands of missions. And sergeants can’t have a finger on every trigger.

The board’s pre-disposition to support rank (of which Bratton has the most) over SWAT experience (of which Bratton has none), and was obvious and gravely insulting to officers who have amassed such a reputation. Disparaging remarks about rank pepper the report, as though stripes and stars are actually brain cells.

The report is riddled with pre-conceived notions and bias. The phrase “military mind-set” is undefined yet repeatedly used disparagingly. What is wrong with having strict discipline among the most heavily armed officers in a peaceful democracy? The report doesn’t say.

Perhaps most insulting is this statement: “SWAT culture and insularity pose a certain danger to the LAPD and the Los Angeles community as a whole.” Yes, the Chief of Police’s handpicked board described his premier unit as “a danger to the community.”

Finally, the report is blatantly self-contradictory. In one matter, it states, “The Board was not presented with anyone espousing contrary views.” Yet, the BOI recommended a contrary course of action anyway.

It repeatedly recommends SWAT train less (despite officers stating they already have reduced effectiveness) yet also suggests multiple new training tasks and an expansion of the platoon that would require far more training than it has previously undertaken.

This Seinfeld-like self-contradictory farce climaxes on page 47 with a recommendation that SWAT use computer analysis to determine “…does or does not SWAT fail to make effective use of negotiation?” Yet almost all of the report’s recommendations flow from that specific conclusion. Well, if we need a computer to figure out the truth, what are the conclusions based on?

I submit: bias and pre-disposition.

The Officers I interviewed held out hope that this BOI would have found opportunities to improve on its already excellent record. Instead, Chief Bratton has chosen to shovel political correctness down the platoon’s throats, regardless of facts and impacts.

A handful of ideas in this report are harmless and potentially even positive. However, in the e-mailed words of a two-decade veteran of the team, in the main “these ideas will get people (officers/citizens/suspects) killed, and have no benefit.”

Chief Bratton should have the courage, humility and intellectual honesty to discard the BOI report and conduct a real analysis of SWAT.