Supreme court upholds porn law

Justice Antonin Scalia writes the opinion in this case, which is known as U.S. v. Williams:

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Supreme Court upheld criminal penalties Monday for promoting child pornography.

The court, in a 7-2 decision, brushed aside concerns that the law could apply to mainstream movies that depict adolescent sex, classic literature or innocent e-mails that describe pictures of grandchildren.

The ruling upheld part of a 2003 law that also prohibits possession of child porn. It replaced an earlier law against child pornography that the court struck down as unconstitutional.

The law sets a five-year mandatory prison term for promoting, or pandering, child porn. It does not require that someone actually possess child pornography. Opponents have said the law could apply to movies like "Traffic" or "Titanic" that depict adolescent sex.

But Justice Antonin Scalia, in his opinion for the court, said the law does not cover movie sex. there is no "possibility that virtual child pornography or sex between youthful-looking adult actors might be covered by the term 'simulated sexual intercourse.'" Scalia said.

Likewise, Scalia said, First Amendment protections do not apply to "offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography."

*There's a lot of interesting thought on the First Ammendment contained throughout Scalia's opinion. Here' s a section on the effect of the ruling on "Hollywood:"

Amici contend that some advertisements for mainstream Hollywood movies that depict underage charactershaving sex violate the statute. Brief for Free Speech Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae 9-18. We think it implausible that a reputable distributor of Hollywood movies,such as Amazon.com, believes that one of these films contains actual children engaging in actual or simulated sex on camera; and even more implausible that Amazon.com would intend to make its customers believe such a thing. The average person understands that sex scenes inmainstream movies use nonchild actors, depict sexual activity in a way that would not rise to the explicit level necessary under the statute, or, in most cases, both.